The Difference Between Narration (Transmission) and Judicial Testimony in Islamic Jurisprudence

الفرق بين الرواية والشهادة في الفقه الإسلامي

Abstract

This study provides a rigorous juristic and epistemological inquiry into the foundational distinction between narrative transmission (Riwāyah) and judicial testimony (Shahādah) within Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh and Usūl al-Fiqh). While both mechanisms function as primary channels of declarative communication (Khabar) for conveying normative and factual knowledge, they diverge fundamentally in their ontological parameters, prerequisite criteria, and legal ramifications. Employing a descriptive, comparative, and analytical methodology, this paper investigates the lexical and conceptual delineations of both constructs, explores the rigorous conditions stipulated by classical hadith critics and legal theorists (Usūliyyūn), and evaluates contentious jurisprudential questions such as the acceptance of transmissions from unapprised narrators (Majhūl al-Hāl) and the testimony of enslaved, speech-impaired, or sight-impaired individuals. Furthermore, the paper synthesizes the seminal contributions of foremost classical theorists, notably Imām al-Qarāfī, Imām al-Ghazzālī, and Imām al-Zarkashī, in discerning the intrinsic boundaries between general normative legislation and specific adjudication. The findings demonstrate that Riwāyah establishes universal, enduring legal obligations applicable across the Muslim polity without necessitating judicial intervention, whereas Shahādah represents an individualized, binding assertion designed to resolve particular disputes exclusively within a court of law before a magistrate (Qādī). Consequently, their validation frameworks, procedural requirements, and evidential thresholds reflect this core distinction between universal normativity and contextual adjudication.